"The Case for Rate Hikes: Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?" by L. Randall Wray
THE CASE FOR RATE HIKES
Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?
l. randall wray
Public Policy Brief
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
No. 79, 2004Public Policy Brief
THE CASE FOR RATE HIKES 
Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?
l. randall wrayThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is an autonomous research organization.
It is nonpartisan, open to the examination of diverse points of view, and dedicated to public service.
The Institute is publishing this research with the conviction that it is a constructive and positive contribution
to discussions and debates on relevant policy issues. Neither the Institute’s Board of Governors nor its
advisers necessarily endorse any proposal made by the authors.
The Institute believes in the potential for the study of economics to improve the human condition.
Through scholarship and research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important 
economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad.
The present research agenda includes such issues as financial instability, poverty, employment, problems
associated with the distribution of income and wealth, and international trade and competitiveness. In all
its endeavors, the Institute places heavy emphasis on the values of personal freedom and justice.
Editor: Greg Hannsgen
Text Editor: Ellen Liebowitz
The Public Policy Brief Series is a publication of The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,Blithewood,
PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000. For information about the Levy Institute and to
order Public Policy Briefs, call 845-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington, D.C.), e-mail info@levy.org,
or visit the Levy Institute website at www.levy.org.
The Public Policy Brief Series is produced by the Bard Publications Office.
Copyright © 2004 The Levy Economics Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic or mechanical,including photocopying,
recording, or any information-retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
ISSN 1063-5297
ISBN 1-931493-38-3Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
The Case for Rate Hikes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
L. Randall Wray
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
ContentsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
For a time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) seemed to have
learned from the mistakes of the past. Instead of taking good economic
performance as a sign of incipient inflation, Chairman Alan Greenspan
kept interest rates relatively low in the late 1990s, even as unemployment
plummeted.Many commentators worried that the FOMC’s unusually easy
stance would usher in a period of runaway inflation, but inflation stayed
in the 2 to 3 percent range.
Now,with scant evidence of an inflationary threat,Greenspan and his
committee seem intent on raising interest rates.Greenspan argues that the
current anemic expansion is “self-sustaining”and no longer needs the sup-
port of low interest rates.
In this new brief, Levy Institute Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray evalu-
ates the Fed’s concern about a coming inflation and its decision to begin
raising interest rates. He begins with an examination of key market devel-
opments that might signal inflation.Most economists worry about inflation
when labor markets begin to tighten and employees gain the bargaining
power necessary to demand pay raises. Wray marshals an array of evidence
demonstrating that workers can only wish for such conditions. The econ-
omy has created no net new jobs since the beginning of the current presi-
dential term. To match the 64.4 percent proportion of adults who held jobs
during the Clinton era, the economy would have to generate four million
new positions.It is clear that the job market will not be a source of inflation
any more than it was during the Clinton boom.
In the absence of any signs of life in labor markets,the main source of
inflationary pressure would be rapid energy price hikes. Given increasing
demand for fossil fuels and current security threats, the United States is
vulnerable to adverse developments in energy markets. But the Federal
Reserve has little direct influence over energy prices.
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Confusion about interest rates goes beyond undue concern about the
threat of inflation.Many observers simply overestimate the power of inter-
est rate policy for good or ill. Much more important to the prospects for
economic growth is the state of the sectoral balances, a point emphasized
by the Levy Institute’s macroeconomic team. These key balances include
the current account balance,the government deficit,and the private sector
balance. Unless policymakers can find some way to safely bring the econ-
omy down from its private-borrowing high wire,monetary policy will not
save the day.
In short, there is much to worry about in these times. The FOMC is
concerned about the wrong issues and is offering the wrong solutions. I
believe this brief makes the case for this view and should be read by all
those concerned with macroeconomic policy.
As this brief goes to press, the FOMC has just raised the federal funds
rate once more. This increase appears to be as unjustified as the previous
two and only increases the chances of a new recession. One could imagine
a new brief on the latest rate increase,and it would make most of the same
points as this piece.We hope the Fed soon recognizes that the case for rate
hikes is weaker than ever.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
September 2004The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
The Federal Reserve has done the inevitable. For months, members of the
Board of Governors have been warning anyone who would listen that “the
federal funds rate cannot be held at its current level indefinitely”and must
be raised “at some point to prevent pressures on price inflation from even-
tually emerging” (Federal Reserve 2004e; 2004f). Further, as the Fed has
firmly embraced what Federal Reserve Board Governor Ben S. Bernanke
(Federal Reserve 2004d) calls “gradualism,”according to which policy raises
(or lowers) rates in a series of small steps over periods as long as three years,
the recent moves to tighten are only the first steps on an “inevitable” path
to higher rates that will be played out over much of the next presidential
term of office.
Searching through the various speeches, testimonies, and press releases
that foreshadowed the recent rate hikes, one can identify only two plausible
justifications for the policy reversal. The first is the most obvious: the Fed’s
credibility had become linked to its repeated warnings that rates would rise;
hence, it had to make good on its threat or suffer the fate of the boy who
cried “wolf.” While this undoubtedly played a role, it is less than satisfying
because the Fed created the expectation that it then needed to fulfill. The
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) might just as well have preserved
the option of discretion by keeping quiet until economic performance cre-
ated conditions in which it believed policy would have to be reversed. This
brings us to the second possible justification,which is the conventional view
that robust economic growth tightens labor markets, thereby increasing
wage demands and causing inflation. The Fed is supposed to “take away the
punch bowl” before the party gets too raucous. Raising interest rate targets
purportedly feeds through to rising longer-term market rates, which cools
borrowing and spending and loosens up labor markets. The question, then,
is whether “accommodative policy”at the Fed threatened to spur inflation.
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This brief examines the case for rate hikes, focusing on these justifica-
tions. If the Fed has misread prevailing economic forces, it will find itself
raising rates to sustain credibility even as the economy deteriorates. Such a
scenario seems likely because,as we now know,both employment and retail
sales data took a sharp turn for the worse during June—even before the Fed
first raised rates on June 30. And yet, as former Governor Lyle Gramley
argues, the Fed must stay the course and continue to raise rates because if
policymakers “chicken out at the first sign of weak numbers, that could end
up bothering the bond markets”(Andrews 2004).In a display of machismo,
the Fed tightened a second time, even in the face of yet more disappointing
numbers. Few doubt that additional rate hikes will be forthcoming.
Are Labor Markets Overheating?
It is no secret that the June and July jobs reports were disappointing, with
monthly nonfarm jobs growth falling rapidly to just 32,000 in July.
Additionally, April and May estimates were revised downward substan-
tially (BLS 2004). As of midyear 2004, one million fewer Americans held
jobs than when President George W. Bush took office. Further, the average
hourly wage increased by only 2 percent over the previous 12 months, less
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than the rate of inflation,which was about 3 percent.Even overall personal
income was flat after adjustments for taxes and inflation (Henderson
2004). Such a weak jobs and wages picture certainly does not lend much
credence to the view that labor markets are overheating and driving infla-
tion upward. However, optimistic commentators believe that June repre-
sents a momentary “blip,” and they expect robust employment and
economic growth to resume. In this section, we will take a detailed look at
the labor market to examine the plausibility of this scenario.
At the end of the Clinton expansion, total employment reached
nearly 138 million, with the employment-population ratio (age 16 years
and over) peaking at 64.4 percent in 1999, then essentially holding steady
into 2001. Between spring 1999 and spring 2000, the Clinton jobs
machine was still adding four million new jobs per year—after adding
about two million jobs per year for the previous seven years.The index of
payrolls (which rises when wages increase and/or when employees are
added) was growing at a healthy clip of 6 percent to 7 percent per year,
while between 1996 and 2000,the real hourly wages of workers rose by 7.5
percent. The number of those working part-time for economic reasons
(workers who wanted,but could not find,full-time jobs) fell continuously
over the Clinton boom—from about five million in 1994 to just over
Figure 2  12-Month Net Change, Employment-Population Ratio, 
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three million in mid-1999. By most accounts, the labor market was tight
by the end of the decade, though Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation
actually achieved a slightly lower average during the booming last half of
the 1990s than it had attained during the more sluggish first half of the
decade.
As the figures in this brief demonstrate,all of these labor market indi-
cators worsened rapidly and markedly when the recession hit in 2000. By
January 2002,the economy was losing jobs at a pace of 1.5 million per year.
Figure 1 shows that the employment-population ratio turned sharply
down as workers lost jobs while the population grew.
Further detail is shown in Figure 2,which graphs 12-month net changes
to the employment-population ratio. This clearly shows growth in all but
one year during the Clinton presidency; by contrast, net change turned
sharply negative after 2000.
After the recession hit, the economy shed jobs at a rapid pace: the
nation lost 750,000 agricultural jobs by June 2001, and about 1.5 million
nonagricultural,private sector positions by July 2002.(See Figure 3,which
shows the net change of nonagricultural, private sector workers.) Further,
as shown in Figure 4, the number of workers in part-time jobs for eco-
nomic reasons rose steadily to 4.8 million in late 2003.
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Finally, Figure 5 shows the 12-month percent change of the index of
private sector payrolls, which turned down sharply during 2000.
While things have improved somewhat over the past two years,all five
figures show rather modest improvement so far. For example, weekly pay-
rolls have been growing since 2002, but that growth is still quite anemic—
at 2 to 3 percent—compared with growth rates well above 5 percent for all
but one year during the Clinton presidency.Indeed,almost the only bright
spot in the labor market is that the number of nonagricultural government
employees has actually grown by nearly 1.3 million since bottoming out in
August 2001 (see Figure 6).
The question is whether the jobs picture has recovered from its reces-
sion-period trough to the extent that policymakers ought to be worrying
about labor market tightness. As of the latest data availability, that case is
quite weak. The employment-population ratio is still falling, because jobs
growth is not keeping pace with population growth.We have gained 100,000
agricultural workers since the trough, but if job growth had continued on
trend since 2000, we would have another 850,000 agricultural workers.
Nonagricultural private sector employment is essentially at midyear 2000
levels; if growth had continued on trend we would have approximately 
five million more nonagricultural workers in the private sector. While the
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economy was adding jobs at a pace of about 1.6 million per year in
December 2003,this rate had fallen to a million a year (at best) by summer
2004.Again,much of the apparent recovery of labor markets in 2001–2003
was due to government hiring. When that turned around sharply, overall
job growth dipped, because the private sector is not adding many jobs.
If we apply the Clinton-era employment-population ratio of 64.4 
percent to today’s population of working-age adults, we would have nearly
four million more workers today. (If, on the other hand, the employment-
population ratio had continued to grow as it did during the Clinton years,we
would have more than six million additional workers and an employment-
population ratio nearing 66 percent.) In order to bring the employment-
population ratio back to 64.4 percent, the economy would have to add
325,000 jobs per month for the next year. Over the longer term, because
the population aged 16 and above grows by approximately 3.5 million per
year,another 188,000 jobs would have to be created every month to absorb
future labor force entrants.
In other words, it is conceivable that we could add half a million jobs
a month for the next year without stretching the labor market. This
achievement would allow us to provide jobs to a growing population, to
those who lost jobs in the recession,and to all those who have come of age
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since 2000 but have not been able to find full-time work. After that, we
would need to continue to add considerably more than 200,000 jobs per
month to accommodate population growth and to allow for slight
increases to the employment-population ratio. These are very high goals,
indeed. During the Clinton expansion, it was not unusual to add 300,000
jobs per month. During the Bush recovery, most months have seen fewer
than 100,000 jobs added. The point is not to argue that we must aim for
500,000 new jobs monthly—which could introduce bottlenecks,especially
for skilled workers—but rather to put into perspective the claim that labor
markets are in danger of becoming overly tight. Employment would have
to grow for many months as rapidly as it did in April and May to make a
dent in the backlog of disappointed workers.
Although the current recovery does not compare favorably with the
1990s expansion, one could object that the “New Economy” boom was
unusual and set an unattainable standard.However,even casual inspection
of the data presented in the figures above reveals that the current recovery
has not yet attained the degree of labor market tightness that was common
in previous recoveries.As Figure 1 demonstrates,employment-population
ratios typically rise by three percentage points or more during expansions;
Figure 2 shows that positive changes to that ratio typically persist for many
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years as robust growth brings new workers into the labor force.Clearly,the
current recovery stands out because we have yet to achieve any growth of
the ratio,although the rate of decrease of the ratio has fallen.By this meas-
ure, there has been no recovery. Figure 3 shows that the Reagan expansion
created two million (or more) nonagricultural,private sector jobs per year
for eight years, and the Clinton expansion, which exhibited a bit more
variability, easily averaged more than two million new jobs for eight years.
In contrast, the current recovery looks more like the 1991–93 period—
often characterized as a “jobless recovery”—than the Reagan or Clinton
expansions. Furthermore, the “recovery” to date has not diminished the
number of part-time workers who want full-time work; indeed,this num-
ber has risen in most months, as shown in Figure 4. Finally, the payroll
index in Figure 5 also shows an unusual weakness when compared with
previous expansions.Labor markets may be poised for recovery,according
to these data, but the same figures indicate that, at best, the economy is in
the earliest stages of expansion. And if the past is any guide, we are years
away from nearing anything like full employment.
The experience to date does not look like an expansion at all, much
less like the later stages of expansion when wage increases supposedly set
off a wage-price spiral.By most measures,the situation looks more like the
“double-dip” and “jobless” recovery of Bush senior. From the vantage
point of labor markets, we can conclude that the most charitable interpre-
tation of the Fed’s policy change is that it appears to be premature.
The Case for Inflation
The conventional view is that economic growth eventually stretches labor
markets, which causes wages to rise and ultimately leads to inflationary
price hikes. While empirical evidence in support of such causal connec-
tions is rather weak, we can set such doubts aside and look for early evi-
dence of wage and price increases.We must also be cognizant of the Fed’s
view that monetary policy operates with long lags, and that once infla-
tion is under way it is very difficult to eradicate. Hence, the conventional
view is that the Fed needs to act preemptively and with vigilance against
the earliest signs of inflation. Let us examine the case for early signs of
inflation.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
In fact, the Fed has already carefully analyzed the data and repeatedly
announced its findings: there is currently no evidence that wage pressures
exist, and no evidence that inflationary pressures are building. In his testi-
mony before the Joint Economic Committee on April 21, 2004, Chairman
Alan Greenspan said that “although the recent data suggest that the worri-
some trend of disinflation presumably has come to an end,still-significant
productivity growth and a sizable margin of underutilized resources, to
date,have checked any sustained acceleration of the general price level and
should continue to do so for a time” (Federal Reserve 2004f). He went on
to note that profit margins have been remarkably high, a situation he
attributed to owners’ reaping of most of the benefits of productivity
increases. Even slowing productivity growth or rising wages, should they
develop, would not necessarily put pressure on prices, because profits can
be reduced to more normal levels. In summary, the chairman predicted
that “an easing of profit margins”rather than “an acceleration of prices”is
probable.
Governor Donald Kohn echoed his chairman in a June 4, 2004 speech
at the National Economists Club, arguing that “inflation is most likely to
remain at levels consistent with a continuation of effective price stability”
(Federal Reserve 2004e). He also mentioned the extraordinarily high profit
margins, asserting that these could “absorb increases in unit labor costs for
a while” before there would be any pressure on prices. He carefully exam-
ined all the other potential sources of inflationary pressure:(1) capacity uti-
lization rates,which,at only 75 percent,were not a concern; (2) energy and
commodity “shocks,” which have been of a “limited nature”; and (3) pro-
ductivity growth, which “will remain strong on a sustained basis,” mitigat-
ing inflation pressures. He concluded that the economy is still operating
with considerable slack and appeared to be somewhat puzzled by how
quickly the fears of deflation morphed into talk of incipient inflation:“Had
I been speaking to you just a year ago, you would have expected me to
address the possibility of deflation....In newspapers and in market reports,
you would have read that the integration of China and India into the global
trading system meant persistent excess supply of labor and products that
would place downward pressure on wages and prices in the developed
world for years to come. Now the concern has shifted to whether inflation
is rising, and those earlier stories are frequently turned on their heads.”He16 Public Policy Brief, No. 79
tried to reassure the audience that “the best indications are that some eco-
nomic slack persists and that long-term inflation expectations are stable,
which bolsters the inference that the economy has not entered a situation
of steadily rising inflation.”
Of course, conventional wisdom holds that the Fed must act preemp-
tively, long before inflation becomes a problem. As Governor Kohn noted
on June 4, however, surveys of inflation expectations “suggest that the
recent uptick in total and core inflation has not materially affected expec-
tations of inflation over the longer term”;rather,the “stability of long-term
inflation expectations is evident”in the case of both professional forecast-
ers and households (Federal Reserve 2004e). In other words, market par-
ticipants seem to agree with Governor Kohn that rising prices in late
spring had more to do with temporary “shocks”(especially energy prices)
than with pressures on capacity or in labor markets. Further, both
Greenspan and Kohn believed that job growth could continue without
generating wage-price inflation because of labor market slack, productiv-
ity growth, and abnormally high profit margins.
Remarkably, less than a month later, Chairman Greenspan and
Governor Kohn joined the rest of the FOMC in raising rates, as a chorus
of voices claimed that the Fed was already “behind the curve” as an infla-
tion fighter. While the proclamations of Fed officials are surprisingly
untainted by evidence or argument in support of the belief that inflation-
ary pressures are rising, it is possible that the FOMC knew more than it
was willing to reveal,or that the data changed markedly after June 4,when
Governor Kohn gave his speech. Let us examine those possibilities.
Data for the month of June (released in mid-July) on retail sales, fac-
tory production, new claims for unemployment benefits, energy prices,
and the producer price index painted a uniformly downbeat picture of a
slowing economy and moderating price increases. Retail sales actually fell
by 1.1 percent,the largest drop in 16 months.Auto sales fell by 4.3 percent,
and industrial production dropped by 0.3 percent (Wall Street Journal
2004; New York Times 2004). Wholesale prices fell by 0.3 percent in June,
with gasoline prices falling by 5.2 percent and residential electric power
prices declining by a record 2.9 percent over the month (New York Times
2004). Presumably, the FOMC had preliminary estimates of all these sta-
tistics at hand for its June 30 meeting. Hence, it does not seem likely thatThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
the decision to raise rates was based on data confirming price pressures
that were not publicly apparent, nor was the decision based on a sudden
upsurge of price pressures in June. The Fed must have known on June 30
that, if anything, inflation was moderating—just as Governor Kohn had
predicted nearly a month earlier.
Further,in his testimony before the Senate on July 20,2004—after the
release of many of the disappointing June figures—Chairman Greenspan
insisted that “between the first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of
2004, all of the 1.1 percent increase in the prices of final goods and ser-
vices produced in the nonfinancial corporate sector can be attributed to a
rise in profit margins rather than rising cost pressures.”He noted that most
cost pressures,such as those coming from the energy sector,are transitory,
while average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers had “barely
budged.”He emphasized that “the modest upward path of unit labor costs
does not appear to threaten longer-term price stability.” However, he
warned that the economy appeared to have attained a “self-sustaining”
expansion such that “monetary accommodation” had become “increas-
ingly unnecessary.” In other words, even though the economy had slowed
noticeably in June, and there was a lack of evidence that wages were heat-
ing up, “monetary policy neutrality” should be restored “at a measured
pace”through rate hikes (Federal Reserve 2004g).
In short, there appears to be little evidence that the Fed raised rates
because of actual or expected, current or future, wage or price inflation.
The best case that can be made is that the economy had only just begun to
recover and, hence, could finally bear a rate hike. In all likelihood, an
expansion strong enough to produce labor market tightness is still years
off, according to the Fed’s own assessment.
An Alternative View: The Importance of Fiscal Stimulus
For some years, scholars at The Levy Economics Institute have promoted
a sectoral-balance approach that emphasizes the necessary relations
among the government, private domestic, and foreign sectors (Godley,
Izurieta, and Zezza 2004). By an accounting relationship, the current
account (foreign) deficit must equal the sum of the government and pri-
vate sector deficits. Clinton’s budget surpluses in the presence of current18 Public Policy Brief, No. 79
account deficits implied large and unsustainable private sector balances.
According to this view,the expansion was doomed because of the surplus-
generated fiscal headwinds, and the subsequent downturn had relatively
little to do with the Fed’s unnecessary rate hikes.It is probable that the ris-
ing interest rates did spook financial markets, with the stock market bust
adding some deflationary pressures through its negative impact on con-
sumption. However, consumers would have eventually slowed the pace of
consumption anyway. Private sector saving was hugely negative, and any
reversion toward normalcy would open a large demand gap. As it hap-
pened, recession did come, largely driven by a reduction of spending by
firms,which lowered aggregate demand and led to layoffs.As the economy
slowed and the Internet-led boom turned to bust, household income fell.
Indeed, a recent release by the IRS shows that total adjusted gross income
on tax returns fell for two consecutive years (for the first time in the post-
war period) by a total of 5.1 percent in nominal terms, or 9.2 percent in
inflation-adjusted terms (Johnston 2004).
With the recession that began in 2000,the federal budget turned around
sharply by a total of about 7 percent of GDP. Between 2000 and 2002, indi-
vidual income taxes fell by 18.8 percent—again, an unprecedented postwar
decline, and a far bigger decline than the loss of income. The IRS study
makes it clear that much of this decline of taxes came at the top of the
income distribution (not surprising, as most individual income taxes come
from the highly paid; most workers pay more in payroll taxes than in federal
income taxes). This is significant because it means that much of the falling
tax revenue was due to economic performance rather than to President
Bush’s tax cuts (the benefits of which did not really kick in until 2003 for the
highest income levels). However, ramped up government spending, espe-
cially on defense, gave a much-needed boost to demand. In 2000, defense
spending actually fell by 0.5 percent;in 2001 it grew by 3.9 percent,and then
by 7.7 percent in 2002 and by 9.0 percent in 2003 (see Table 2 and related
discussion below). Federal nondefense spending also grew rapidly, by 7.1
percent in 2002,adding fuel to the recovery.As we saw above,the number of
government employees grew, helping to turn consumer spending around.
By the second quarter of 2003, federal government defense spending
accounted for 1.5 percentage points of the 4.1 percent growth pace of GDP.
In other words,growth of defense spending alone made up some 27 percentThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
of economic growth by mid-2003. Take that away, and the “hot” pace of
recovery in 2003 becomes an anemic 2.6 percent growth rate (BEA 2004).
Another way of looking at the fiscal stimulus originating from the 
federal government is through the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA)
quantity indexes, which set real spending equal to 100 for the year 2000
(BEA 2004). The quantity index for GDP reached 109.8 by the second
quarter of 2004, meaning real output grew by almost 10 percent over the
approximately three and a half years of the Bush presidency.Personal con-
sumption reached an index of 112.2,so it actually grew by more than GDP.
By contrast, private investment reached only 104.8, in spite of relatively
strong growth of investment in the last few quarters. However, because
investment had plummeted to less than 90 in the aftermath of the reces-
sion, it was growing from a depressed base. By contrast, the federal gov-
ernment index stood at 124.1 in the second quarter of 2004—meaning
federal government spending grew by nearly 25 percent in quantity terms.
It is also interesting to note that this strong growth of federal spending 
is reflected in price indices (BEA 2004). Again using the year 2000 as 
the base (with all price indices set to 100), the overall GDP price index
reached 108.2 in the second quarter of 2004. The price index for personal
Table 1 Price and Quantity Indexes (Base Year 2000=100)
2001 2002 2003 2004,Q2
Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
GDP 100.75 102.40 102.63 104.10 105.75 106.00 109.78 108.16
PCE 102.54 102.09 105.70 103.55 109.14 105.51 112.21 107.72
Inv. 92.10 101.01 89.93 101.22 93.85 102.30 104.78 104.43
Gov. 103.41 102.54 107.92 105.31 110.91 108.70 113.08 111.61
Federal 103.91 101.91 111.73 105.29 119.14 109.08 124.07 112.00
State 103.16 102.87 106.00 105.32 106.74 108.59 107.51 111.39
Source: BEA (2004)
PCE = Personal Consumption Expenditures
Inv. = Gross Private Domestic Investment
Gov. = Government Consumption and Gross Investment
Federal, State = Federal and State Components of Gov.20 Public Policy Brief, No. 79
consumption reached only 107.7, meaning that consumption prices actu-
ally grew more slowly than prices for output as a whole. The investment
price index reached only 104.4, which appears to be consistent with slug-
gish growth of investment spending. However, the federal government
price index had risen to 112, far above the general price increases. Thus,
both in terms of quantities purchased and prices paid,government spend-
ing was leading the way to recovery.
However, the fiscal stimulus coming from the Bush tax cuts plus the
increase of spending for the military and for domestic security probably
peaked in the last half of 2003. Between the third quarter of 2001 and the
third quarter of 2003, personal current taxes fell from $1.11 trillion to
$0.95 trillion (seasonally adjusted at annual rates, BEA 2004), and then
began to grow quarter by quarter (to $1.03 trillion in the second quarter
of 2004). Contributions for government social insurance (payroll taxes)
grew slowly until mid-2003, after which the pace of growth accelerated.
And taxes on corporate income fell at a 23 percent rate in 2001 and at a 10
percent rate in 2002, but rose at a 27.8 percent pace over 2003. Thus, fiscal
stimulus began to decline during 2003 as taxes started to grow rapidly.
Growth of spending for national defense fell sharply from a 10.6 percent
pace in the first quarter of 2004 to 1.9 percent by the second quarter (see
Table 2). Indeed, the latest figures show national defense spending con-
tributing only 0.09 percentage points to the much lower 3 percent GDP
growth rate reported by the BEA on July 30—compared with its contribu-
tion of 1.5 percentage points in mid-2003 to the higher 4.1 percent growth
rate of that period.Hence,by a number of measures,fiscal policy has tight-
ened noticeably since midyear 2003. This tightening is also reflected in the
administration’s newest revisions to its budget projections, lowering the
anticipated deficit by about $100 billion.
The apparent reduction of fiscal stimulus has taken its toll on con-
sumption and on real GDP growth, generally, as shown in Table 2. Real
GDP growth declined by a third between the first and second quarters of
this year, with personal consumption expenditure growth falling 
by three-quarters. Motor vehicle sales plummeted, as did farm sales. The
Commerce Department reported on July 28 that durable goods orders fell
by 2.7 percent in April and by 0.9 percent in May before rising by 0.7 per-
cent in June. However, excluding military orders (especially for aircraftThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
and parts), durable goods orders would have fallen by 0.4 percent in June.
The Fed’s “beige book,” released at the end of July, reported that growth
was moderating in several districts, led by slowing consumer spending,
and that there was relatively little retail price pressure except in energy
products (Federal Reserve 2004a).
Further, the Labor Department reported on July 29 that wage and
benefit growth had slowed in the second quarter to just 0.9 percent.Wages
rose by only 0.6 percent over the period, the sixth quarter out of the past
eight in which wages grew at 0.6 percent or less. Benefit costs climbed by
1.8 percent, down from a 2.4 percent increase in the previous quarter
(Associated Press 2004). This deceleration is important, because the Fed
had previously cited accelerating benefit costs as evidence that labor mar-
kets were on an inflationary path. Overall, excluding energy and food,
inflation proceeded at an annual pace of just 1.8 percent in the second
quarter, down from 2.1 percent in the first.
Table 2 Real GDP Growth,Selected Components
Percent Change from Preceding Year (2000–2003); Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rate (2004)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004, Q1 2004, Q2
Real GDP 3.7 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.5 3.0
PCE 4.7 2.5 3.1 3.3 4.1 1.0
Motor Vehicles -1.8 -4.7 11.6 4.2 8.8 -25.5
Farms 13.7 -8.3 6.5 4.0 -31.3 -21.8
Defense -0.5 3.9 7.7 9.0 10.6 1.9
Nondefense 3.5 3.9 7.1 2.4 0.2 4.3
State and Local 2.7 3.2 2.8 0.7 0.0 2.1
Government 2.1 3.4 4.4 2.8 2.5 2.3
Source: BEA (2004)
PCE = Personal Consumption Expenditures
Motor Vehicles = Motor Vehicle Output
Farms = Farm Gross Value Added
Defense = Federal Government Defense Spending
Nondefense = Federal Nondefense Spending
State and Local = State and Local Government Spending
Government = Government Consumption and Gross Investment22 Public Policy Brief, No. 79
Greenspan and others have tried to put an optimistic spin on these
data, saying they are evidence of a mere “soft patch.”The chairman main-
tained that the economy is in a “self-sustaining expansion that no longer
needed the strong monetary stimulus the Fed provided” (Reuters 2004).
However, even if recovery does resume, and even if recovery does eventu-
ally become an expansion as strong as that achieved in the last half of the
1990s, it is difficult to see why the economy needs higher interest rates
now, as fiscal policy tightens.
Conclusion
It is rather easy to make the case that our economy is some four to six mil-
lion jobs short of achieving the sort of labor market “tightness” that
induced the Fed to hike rates at the peak of the Clinton expansion. Many
have credited the Fed with its swift move to lower rates during the reces-
sion that followed,and most have credited the Fed’s accommodative stance
for the recovery of the past three years. However, there is little doubt that
the recovery has been weak by historical standards, and there is some pos-
sibility that the economy is now “double-dipping”or at least hitting a “soft
patch,”in the chairman’s own words.Hence,the most favorable view of the
Fed’s recent move to tighten is that it comes several years—or more—
before there is any danger of widespread labor market tightening that
would threaten wage stability. A less sanguine view is that the Fed’s move
to tighten is wrongheaded,especially given that the fiscal stimulus appears
to have peaked.Further,both political parties plan to try to tighten the fis-
cal stance further (if possible),and there is certainly no political will to add
fiscal stimulus in the near future. If the view held by many scholars at the
Levy Institute is correct,the combination of attenuated fiscal stimulus plus
rising debt service burdens due to higher interest rates could be deadly.
The private sector already appears to be reducing its reliance on borrow-
ing. Add oil-price uncertainty and security concerns to the mix, and it is
difficult to make a strong case for preemptive strikes against pay raises that
might be forthcoming several years down the road when we recover all
those lost jobs and start creating new ones.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
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